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O
nly about 1% of newly developed drugs are for 
tropical diseases, such as African sleeping sickness, 
dengue fever, and leishmaniasis [1]. While patent 
incentives and commercial pharmaceutical houses have made 
Western health care the envy of the world, the commercial 
model only works if companies can sell enough patented 
products to cover their research and development (R&D) 
costs. The model fails in the developing world, where few 
patients can afford to pay patented prices for drugs. 
It is easy and correct to say that Western governments could 
solve this problem by paying existing institutions to focus on 
cures for tropical diseases. But sadly, there does not appear to 
be enough political will for this to happen. In any case, grants 
and patent incentives were never designed with tropical 
diseases in mind. 
Two main kinds of proposals have been suggested 
for tackling the problem. The ﬁ  rst is to ask sponsors—
governments and charities—to subsidize developing-country 
purchases at a guaranteed price [2,3,4]. The second involves 
charities creating nonproﬁ  t venture-capital ﬁ  rms (“Virtual 
Pharmas”), which look for promising drug candidates 
and then push drug development through contracts with 
corporate partners. In this article, we discuss the limitations 
of these two approaches and suggest a third, “open source,” 
approach to drug development, called the Tropical Diseases 
Initiative (TDI). We envisage TDI as a decentralized, 
Web-based, community-wide effort where scientists from 
laboratories, universities, institutes, and corporations could 
work together for a common cause (see www.tropicaldisease.
org).
Why Open Source?
The idea behind asking sponsors to subsidize developing 
country purchases at a guaranteed price is that this will prop 
up drug prices and restore incentives for developing new 
drugs [2,3,4]. In other words, it is a way of ﬁ  xing the patent 
problem. However, subsidies have an important weakness: 
it is almost impossible to determine correctly how large 
the subsidy should be. In principle, the most cost-effective 
solution is to set a subsidy that just covers expected R&D 
costs. But how large is that? R&D costs are very poorly known, 
with the published estimates quoting uncertainties exceeding 
$100 to $500 million per drug. If the subsidy is set too low, 
companies cannot cover their R&D costs and nothing will 
happen. Set the subsidy too high, and the sponsor’s costs 
skyrocket. To date, no sponsor has tried to implement these 
proposals.
In the “Virtual Pharma” approach, governments and 
philanthropies fund organizations that identify and help 
support the most promising private and academic research. 
Examples include the Institute for One World Health (www.
iowh.org), a not-for-proﬁ  t pharmaceutical company funded 
mainly through private sources and the Gates Foundation, 
and the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (www.dndi.
org), a public sector not-for-proﬁ  t organization designed 
to mobilize resources for R&D on new drugs for neglected 
diseases.
Virtual Pharmas have clearly started to bear fruit, and 
are responsible for most candidate treatments for tropical 
diseases currently under development. For example, the 
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative has a portfolio of nine 
projects spread out across the drug development pipeline 
for the treatment of leishmaniasis, sleeping sickness, Chagas 
disease, and malaria [6]. But Virtual Pharmas face three 
important problems. The ﬁ  rst is similar to the problem 
faced by subsidy proposals: guessing private-sector R&D 
costs. One needs to understand what a product costs in 
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Box 1. Possible Licenses for TDI Discoveries
▪ A public-domain license that permits anyone to use the 
information for any purpose.
▪ Licenses similar to the Creative Commons Attribution License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0) that permit 
anyone to use the information for any purpose, provided proper 
attribution is given.
▪ Licenses such as the General Public License (www.opensource.
org/licenses/gpl-license.php) that prohibit users from seeking 
intellectual property rights.
▪ Licenses that permit commercial companies to obtain and 
exploit patents outside the developing world. These would allow 
Virtual Pharma to stretch its own R&D funds by letting corporate 
partners sell patented products to ecotourists, governments, and 
other consumers living in the industrialized world.PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 184
order to negotiate the best possible price—and guessing 
wrong is likely to be expensive. Second, Virtual Pharma’s 
development pipelines will run dry with  out more upstream 
research. Research has been particularly weak in exploiting 
genomic insights [7]. Third, tropical disease research is badly 
underfunded. For this reason, Virtual Pharma cannot succeed 
without rigid cost containment. 
We believe that a new, com  munity-wide consortium, the 
Tropical Disease Initiative, can help solve these problems. Its 
success would help keep Virtual Pharma’s R&D pipeline full. 
Furthermore, it would use open-source licenses to keep its 
discoveries freely available to researchers and—eventually—
manufacturers. As we explain below, well-designed open-source 
licenses are the key to containing Virtual Pharmas’ R&D costs. 
While we expect the ﬁ  nal choice of license to be made 
by TDI’s members, the guiding principle should be to pick 
whatever license lets developing country patients derive the 
most beneﬁ  t from TDI’s work. Possible choices are shown in 
Box 1. 
How It Works
To date, open-source methods have made little headway 
beyond software [8]. However, computing and computational 
biology are converging. In the same way that programmers 
ﬁ  nd bugs and write patches, biologists look for proteins 
(“targets”) and select chemicals (“drug candidates”) that bind 
to them and affect their behavior in desirable ways. In both 
cases, research consists of ﬁ  nding and ﬁ  xing tiny problems 
hidden in an ocean of code.
What would open-source drug discovery look like? As with 
current software collaborations, we propose a Web site where 
volunteers use a variety of computer programs, databases, 
and computing hardware (Figure 1). Individual pages would 
host tasks like searching for new protein targets, ﬁ  nding 
chemicals to attack known targets, and posting data from 
related chemistry and biology experiments. Volunteers could 
use chat rooms and bulletin boards to announce discoveries 
and debate future research directions. Over time, the most 
dedicated and proﬁ  cient volunteers would become leaders. 
Ten years ago, TDI would not have been feasible. The 
difference today is the vastly greater size and variety of 
chemical, biological, and medical databases; new software; 
and more powerful computers. Researchers can now identify 
promising protein targets and small sets of chemicals, 
including good lead compounds, using computation 
alone. For example, a SARS protein similar to mRNA cap-
1 methyltransferases—a class of proteins with available 
inhibitors—was recently identiﬁ  ed by scanning proteins 
encoded by the SARS genome against proteins of known 
structure [9]. This discovery provides an important new 
target for future experimental validation and iterative lead 
optimization. More generally, existing projects such as the 
University of California at San Francisco’s Tropical Disease 
Research Unit (San Francisco, California, United States) 
show that even relatively modest computing, chemistry, and 
biology resources can deliver compounds suitable for clinical 
trials [10]. Increases in computing power and improved 
computational tools will make these methods even more 
powerful in the future.
Just as they do today, Virtual Pharmas would choose 
the best candidates. The difference is that open-source 
drugs could not be patented in developing countries. This 
would not stop Virtual Pharma from developing promising 
discoveries. (S. Nwaka, V. Hale, personal communications). 
Importantly, TDI would be a great boost to the efforts of 
Virtual Pharmas, because it would help to contain the costs of 
discovering, developing, and manufacturing drugs. 
Cost Containment
TDI would contain costs in three important ways. First, TDI 
would ask volunteers to donate their time (and any patentable 
discoveries) to the collaboration. Instead of ﬁ  nancial 
incentives, TDI would offer volunteers non-monetary rewards, 
such as ideological satisfaction, the acquisition of new skills, 
enhancement of professional reputation, and the ability 
to advertise one’s skills to potential employers. Software 
collaborations have demonstrated that these incentives are a 
good way to attract and motivate programmers [11]. Similar 
incentives should work equally well for biologists, chemists, 
and other scientists.
Second, we have already pointed out that existing proposals 
have difﬁ  culty containing costs. The root cause is patents. 
Normally, society relies on competition to keep prices low. 
Patents—by design—short-circuit competition by giving the 
owners the legal right to prevent others from using (or even 
developing) their invention. TDI, on the other hand, would 
restore competition by making drug candidates available to 
anyone who wanted to develop them. We expect sponsors to 
exploit this advantage by signing development contracts with 
whichever company offers the lowest bid. Such competitive 
bidding is a powerful way to contain costs, and is also a 
good way to develop drugs. Virtual Pharma has extensive 
experience supervising contract research. 
Third, the absence of patents would continue to keep 
prices low once drugs reached the market. The generic drug 
industry shows what happens once drug makers are allowed 
to compete. US drugs frequently fall to about one-third their 
original price when patents expire [12]. 
Intellectual Property Rights
Would universities and corporations really let their people 
volunteer? Won’t they insist on intellectual property rights? 
The practical answer is that sensible managers do not care 
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Figure 1. The TDI Model of Online CollaborationPLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 185
about intellectual property rights unless they expect to earn 
a proﬁ  t. This explains why sophisticated university licensing 
ofﬁ  ces seldom bother to interfere with open-source software 
projects that are not commercially valuable [13]. The same 
logic would apply to open-source drug discovery. We would 
hope that life sciences companies would make a similar 
calculation. But permitting employees to participate is only 
the beginning. We think that universities and companies 
will also donate the data, research tools, and other resources 
needed to make TDI even stronger. The reason, once again, 
is that they have little to lose. The value of their intellectual 
property depends almost entirely on US and European 
diseases. For this reason, it costs very little to share their 
information with tropical disease researchers. In fact, drug 
companies already do this [14]. TDI’s main challenge will 
be to show donors that an open-source project can keep 
members from diverting donated information back into the 
commercially lucrative diseases that affect patients in the 
West.
Finally, there are precedents for private companies 
developing drugs off patent. During the 1950s, March 
of Dimes (see www.marchofdimes.com) developed polio 
vaccines without any patents at all [15]. It then signed 
guaranteed purchase contracts with any drug maker willing to 
develop commercial-scale production methods. The incentive 
may not have been conventional, but it worked. And why not? 
The contracts made good business sense: contract proﬁ  ts may 
have been small compared to the proﬁ  ts on patented drugs, 
but so was the risk. Fifty years later, contract research still 
makes sense. Generic drug companies, developing world drug 
manufacturers, contract research organizations, and biotech 
ﬁ  rms have all said that they would consider contracts to 
develop open-source drug candidates. (M. Spino, S. Sharma, 
F. Hijek, and D. Francis, personal communications).
Next Steps
So far, we have described a shoestring operation that exists 
mainly on the Web. Except for computer time, budgets would 
be more or less the same as existing software collaborations. 
Computing would be expensive but manageable. Today’s 
biologists routinely scrounge resources from university 
machines or borrow time on home computers [16, 17]. 
This Web-centric approach would be a good start, but not a 
complete solution. Computational biology works best when 
it can interact with experimental chemistry and biology. 
Nevertheless, a low-budget computational approach is 
probably enough to generate new science, suggest ideas 
for follow-up experiments, and make new drug candidates 
available under licenses designed to yield maximum beneﬁ  t 
to the developing world.
In practice, an open-source drug discovery effort is likely 
to include modest experiments. Many academic scientists 
control discretionary resources and, in some cases, tropical 
disease grants. Furthermore, good science generates its 
own funding. We expect experimentalists to turn the 
collaboration’s Web pages into grant proposals.
That said, TDI’s volunteers will be most productive if 
sponsors back them. Charities could support open-source 
drug discovery by making wet chemistry and biology 
experiments a top priority. Corporations could also help by 
donating funds, laboratory time, or previously unpublished 
results. One low cost/high value option would be for 
companies that have already tried a particular research 
direction to warn TDI if the collaboration was about 
to investigate a known dead end. (R. Altman, personal 
communication)
Conclusion
Open-source drug discovery is feasible—that is, no known 
scientiﬁ  c or economic barrier bars the way. But what are the 
risks? Experience with software collaborations highlights 
the main social and economic challenges. First, the project 
will have to ﬁ  nd and motivate volunteers. Based on existing 
software collaborations, we estimate a required minimum 
“critical mass” of a few dozen active members. Second, 
modest chemistry and biology experiments will be needed 
to increase the chances for success. Resources of several 
hundred thousand dollars per year—mostly in the form 
of in-kind donations of databases, laboratory access, and 
computing time—would make open-source drug discovery 
much more powerful. By most standards, such risks are real 
but acceptable.
The largest uncertainties are scientiﬁ  c. Can a volunteer 
effort based on computational biology and modest 
experiments produce the high-quality drug candidates 
that Virtual Pharma needs? A successful program must 
(1) make a signiﬁ  cant contribution toward supplying the 
genomic insights that tropical disease research needs to move 
forward, and (2) make useful drug candidates available for 
development and production under open-source licenses. 
Open-source drug discovery looks feasible. The only way to be 
sure is to do the experiment—and we invite you to join us.  
To learn more about TDI or to volunteer, go to http:⁄⁄www.
tropicaldisease.org
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